New Regional Authorities: Self-Determination and the Global South
Cambridge University Press, 2026 [view excerpt]
The idea that regional organizations rightly occupy a central place in human rights, global governance, and international intervention has come to be taken for granted in international politics. Yet, the idea of regions as authorities is not a natural feature of the international system. Instead, it was strategically constructed by the leaders in the Global South as a way of maintaining their voice in global decision-making and managing (though not preventing) outside interference. I explore changes in the norms and practice of international interference in late 1970s and early 1980s, a time when Latin American and African leaders began to empower their regional organizations to enforce human rights. This change represented a form of quiet resistance to the imposition of human rights enforcement and a transformation in the ongoing struggle for self-determination.
I show that prominent supporters of human rights within these regions sharply criticized forms of enforcement that they viewed as counter to the principle of self-determination, while encouraging forms of enforcement that were not. Oppressive dictators and leaders that genuinely supported human rights cooperated in an attempt to establish an alternative regional authority over human rights, one in which they could exercise greater voice and influence. States violating human rights became willing to delegate genuinely challenging authority to their regional organizations. These otherwise puzzling behaviors can be explained as attempts to create forms of enforcement that were more consistent with the principle of self-determination.
Peer-Reviewed Articles
“Trading Sovereignty for Self-Determination,” International Studies Quarterly, 68(1), 2024. [view]
Weak or dependent states, especially those with histories of colonial and imperial domination, have traditionally been among the strongest advocates for strict institutionalization and observance of the norm of non-interference. These states are vulnerable to international pressure, and they have sought to limit this pressure by “jealously” guarding their sovereignty. Yet, after decades of advocating for strict non-interference, many weak states have begun to delegate extensive interventionist authority to their regional organizations. What explains this change? I argue that an important motivation was an attempt to maintain self-determination. I extend the definition of self-determination to incorporate self-determination over international rules, which distinguishes voluntarily delegating authority from having external authority imposed. I then examine the decision by Latin American states to compromise on non-interference by delegating authority to enforce human rights to the Organization of American States. I provide evidence that this change cannot be fully explained without accounting for the importance of self-determination as a political goal of states.
“Empowering to Constrain: Procedural Checks in International Organizations,” Review of International Organizations, 2024. [view]
Why would weak states accept rules which authorize strong states to take coercive action against them? I argue that, in some cases, this is a way of creating constraints over the exercise power in the form of procedural checks, or rules delineating the process through which power can legitimately be exercised. If stronger states become willing to exercise power against weak states in the absence of rules formally authorizing their behavior, this presents their actions as the new status quo. In response, weak states can attempt to re-establish constraints over the exercise of power by formally sanctioning unwanted actions, but doing so alongside procedural checks. To assess this argument, I examine the addition of a human rights suspension clause to the Lomé Convention, an aid and preferential trade agreement between the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of states. The ACP states accepted a suspension clause after nearly twenty years of arguing that such a clause was paternalistic and violated the norm of non-interference. Explanations for this decision that point to one-sided dominance of IOs by the strong or straightforward support for policies on the part of the weak cannot account for important dynamics, including continued objections to the practice of suspensions by ACP states and the willingness of European states to accept and utilize procedural checks.
“The Global South and Global Human Rights: International responsibility for the right to development.” Third World Quarterly, 43(10): 2337-2356 (2022). [view]
Human rights are typically understood as governing the behavior of states towards the people within their borders. In this article, I argue that this domestic formulation of human rights is not universal, but came about through political bargaining and contestation. From at least the early twentieth century, a range of actors from the Global South developed an understanding of individual and collective rights that emphasized international responsibility, especially of wealthy, powerful states towards people in poorer, weaker states. I show that this foundational understanding served as an important basis for the how the Global South engaged with economic and social rights within the United Nations before, during, and after the adoption of the Universal Bill of Rights. It eventually manifested in the campaign for the human right to development. Through an exploration of the drafting history of the Declaration on the Right to Development, I show how international responsibility was kept out of the declaration by the Western states that stood to be held responsible. Examining this alternative understanding of human rights recovers a forgotten contribution of the Global South, while shedding light on obstacles to contemporary political projects like the campaign for international slavery reparations.
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