TRADING SOVEREIGNTY FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
Throughout the Global South, states have developed extensive mechanisms within their regional organizations to monitor and enforce their own compliance with international norms. What explains the decision to create, accept, and expand these mechanisms? Why has this change happened unevenly across regions? After at least a century of resisting imperial and colonial domination and decades of using regional organizations to “jealously” protect their sovereignty, why have so many states adopted positions that compromise on the norm of non-interference? I argue that states created these mechanisms as part of a strategy to counter the imposition of authority, especially by powerful Western states in the form of economic conditions.
In doing this, I argue that states were motivated by the desire to enhance their self-determination. As shifting global norms legitimized and encouraged enforcement by powerful states, states in the Global South faced a new decision: not whether human rights should be enforced, but who should enforce them. In regions that faced these new pressures, states responded by attempting to establish regional authority over human rights enforcement, delegating new authority to their regional organization and then persuading other actors to accept the regional organization as a legitimate authority over human rights in the region. Doing so allowed them to limit the imposition of unwanted authority and manage external interference. Where these pressures did not arise, states maintained their previous stance on non-interference.
I find that, counter to the expectations of existing research, states that were proponents of international human rights were among the most vocal critics of global enforcement. States that were themselves guilty of abusing human rights were willing to delegate more authority at the regional level than the global level. These otherwise puzzling behaviors can be explained by the drive for self-determination over international rules. In Latin America and Africa, faced with mounting pressure from the West that stood to undermine their self-determination, states moved towards regional intervention. Conversely, in the Middle East, states encountered little to no enforcement pressure, and regional mechanisms came about much later and were granted very little authority.
The Global South and Global Human Rights: International responsibility for the right to development [view] (Forthcoming at Third World Quarterly)
International human rights are typically conceived of as entitlements that individuals hold in relation to their government. However, since at least the early twentieth century, leaders, activists, jurists, and scholars in the Global South have emphasized the existence of international responsibility for problems of oppression, deprivation, and injustice. In this view, realizing individual rights necessitates international obligations. This understanding came to influence the Global South’s engagement with human rights within the U.N., culminating in the campaign for the right to development. I demonstrate that the flaws often attributed to the right to development—most importantly, that it lacks identifiable actors bearing duties to realize the right—were the product of political bargaining over the Declaration on the Right to Development, in which representatives of states in the Global North were able to hold out against the demands of the Global South. In spite of the centrality of international responsibility to the right to development, this right was codified in a way that emphasized the obligations of poor states towards their own citizens, rather than the extreme concentration of wealth in the West, economic rules that severely disadvantaged poor states, and the historical wrongs that were implicated in their poverty.
Trading Sovereignty for Self-Determination [view, Appendix available upon request]
(Invited to Revise & Resubmit)
Weak states, especially those with a recent history of colonial or imperial domination, have traditionally been among the strongest advocates for strict norms of sovereignty and non-interference. These states are vulnerable to international pressure and interference, and they have sought to limit these pressures by “jealously” guarding their sovereignty. Yet, after decades of advocating for strict non-interference, many of these states became willing to delegate extensive interventionist authority to their own regional organizations. I examine this change in the case of human rights. I argue that states delegated authority to enforce human rights to a regional organization as a way of resisting the imposition of unwanted authority, including enforcement by powerful, Western states in the form of economic conditions. By establishing their organizations as a legitimate authority over human rights—creating regional enforcement mechanisms and then asserting the authority of regional enforcement—states were able to effectively trade sovereignty for self-determination. In making this argument, I expand the concept of self-determination to incorporate self-determination over international rules. I argue that, by employing this strategy, states were able to actually increase their discretion over the design and implementation of international policy, even while compromising on their absolute sovereign authority. Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence, I show that the decision by Latin American states to accept and expand the authority of the Organization of American States to enforce human rights cannot be fully explained without accounting for the importance to these states of self-determination.
Procedural Checks and Constraint through Delegation [email me to view]
Weak states have traditionally been among the greatest beneficiaries of strict norms of non-interference, and yet in recent decades, many have nevertheless chosen to delegate interventionist authority to international organizations. More puzzlingly, they often delegate this authority to international organizations in which much stronger states are members, even though rules prohibiting interference are directed in large part at constraining these very states. What explains this behavior? In this paper, I argue that this can actually a way of limiting unwanted interference by much stronger states. If strong states become willing to systematically disregard rules prohibiting interference, weak states are left with few means of stopping them. Instead, their best response may be to establish influence over the interference. They can do so by creating procedural checks, or rules about the process for carrying out interventionist actions. Doing so can actually reduce the likelihood and extent of interference. To assess this argument, I use a historical institutionalist approach, examining institutional development as the product of political contestation over time. I look at the addition of a human rights suspension clause to the Lomé Convention, an aid and preferential trade agreement between the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of states. This clause was added in spite of continuing objections to the practice of suspension by ACP states, and it represented an attempt by them to create procedural checks in order to constrain the use of suspension of Lomé.
Global Governance, Self-Determination, and State Weakness (Under review) [email me to view]
How does global governance affect collective self-determination? Under what circumstances does delegating authority to an international organization, accepting international interference, or participating in a political order diminish self-determination, and when are these actions consistent with or even an expression of self-determination? I argue that participating in global governance and even accepting international interference can be consistent with collective self-determination provided that a state, and its citizens, are able to meaningfully participate in the design or implementation of international rules to which they are subject and to domestically affirm the decision to be bound by them. To develop this argument, I extend the concept of self-determination to incorporate self-determination over international rules. This distinction is especially relevant for states in the Global South. For many of these states, material weakness, external dependence, and unequal integration into the international system leave them vulnerable to the undermining and diminishment of their self-determination. In many cases, international rules are accepted primarily in response to external pressure, and states are limited in their ability to participate in their implementation, elaboration, or enforcement.
Works in progress
Alienation and Powerlessness: Why ‘Good’ states oppose international norms
Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Illiberal Regional Organizations and Autocratic States
(with Melissa Samarin)